At the 2026 Switalskis Mental Capacity Act Conference, Pippa Pudney of Serjeants’ Inn Chambers explored how information relevant to different capacity decisions can overlap, and the challenges this creates for Court of Protection practitioners.

Her session considered how assessments can remain specific to the decision at hand while producing conclusions that are practical, meaningful and reflective of the individual’s circumstances.

Residence, care and contact

Residence, care and contact are closely connected. Where a person lives may influence the care and support they receive, as well as their ability to maintain relationships with family and friends. Decisions about accepting or refusing care can therefore affect the options available to them.

In Lancashire CC v BC & Anor [2026] EWCOP 18, the court considered whether BC could make decisions about residence when she lacked capacity to make certain decisions about care, support and contact. Although the expert evidence suggested she could choose between residential options capable of meeting her needs, Poole J was concerned that any choice about residence would be illusory if decisions about care and contact ultimately determined where she could live. ‘If BC’s best interests lay in her care and support being provided at placement X rather than placement Y, then BC could not choose to live at placement Y: she would not have a choice of residence open to her .’ This case highlights the importance of considering how different capacity domains interact in practice and how this impacts the options that are available to a vulnerable individual.

Marriage and sexual relations

Pudney also considered the relationship between capacity to marry and capacity to engage in sexual relations. Although these are distinct legal domains, the relevant information for one may have implications for the other.

In A Local Authority v AC & Ors [2026] EWCOP 31, the court considered how capacity to marry relates to capacity to engage in sexual relations. The judgment recognised that the obligations associated with marriage are nuanced and change over time. It was noted that capacity to engage in sexual relations does not, by itself, establish capacity to marry, but that capacity to engage in sexual relations is necessary for capacity to marry. The decision illustrates the importance of recognising the relationship between capacity domains with an eye for what the conclusions reached could mean for the person the declaration is being made about.

What does this mean for practitioners?

Pudney’s central message was that capacity assessments must reflect the reality of the decision facing the individual. Practitioners should recognise where relevant information overlaps without artificially separating connected decisions.